

Online Appendix: The core voter's curse: Clientelistic threats and promises in Hungarian elections

November 5, 2017

A List experiments

A.1 Full wording of list experiments

The following list experiments were used to measure exposure to clientelism. Items in red are the sensitive items that were randomly assigned to only half of the respondents.

Lender Pressure

- Rushing to vote was first thing for people to do in the morning.
- People went to vote at different times of the day.
- The election commission could not provide a vote to everybody.
- I was worried that I would owe more to my creditor if I voted badly.

Welfare Pressure

- Some candidates visited our locality.
- One of the candidates promised to protect animal rights.
- None of the candidates visited our locality.
- I was worried that a family member would drop out of the public works program if I voted wrong.

Mayor Favor

- There were Fidesz posters in my neighborhood.
- None of the parties had posters in my neighborhood.
- I got into a fight over politics.
- I was expecting a favor from the men of the mayor in case I voted well.

Vote Buying


- I saw some Jobbik posters.
- I did not see any Jobbik posters.
- I met one of the candidates also in person.
- In the last elections I was offered a gift, drink, or food in return for my vote.

A.2 Pretests of list experiments

Before the full survey, we extensively piloted the list experiments to identify sensitive and control items that would maximize the accuracy and efficiency of our lists. To test the sensitive items with direct questions, we conducted a pilot with 98 respondents in a locality with high levels of clientelism. The results of the pilot suggest that the prevalence of the forms of clientelism that we measure is robust to a number of different ways of wording the sensitive items in the lists. The question wordings were randomly assigned to respondents so that in expectation they should produce the same prevalence measures.

Figure A1 plots the proportion of respondents who reported experiencing five different types of clientelism during this pretest, asked in two or three different ways for each form of clientelism. In three out of four cases, these variations in wording results in small differences in the measured prevalence of the forms of clientelism. The one difference appeared in the questions we tested for measuring mayor favors, where we measured a prevalence of 4% with a question asking whether the respondent was offered a favor by the mayor's men, and 27% based on their expectations that they would get a favor from the mayor's men. Our interpretation of this divergence between expectations and explicit promises is that repeated exchanges may not be made explicit before each election, but may nevertheless have an important effect on behavior.

Figure A1: Estimated incidence of clientelistic strategies by question wording



B Robustness to alternative measures of closeness to party

In this section we assess the robustness of our main analysis to alternative measures of closeness to party. First, we analyze closeness to party as a categorical variable in order to identify which particular contrasts are driving our results. Second, as a robustness test we look at two measures of closeness to party that are more plausibly exogenous to the past receipt of benefits. One concern with the main results presented in Table 2 is that closeness to party might be driven in part by past receipt of benefits. In order to rule this out, we test whether the results still hold with two alternative measures of closeness to party. First, we test robustness to a binary measure of whether the respondent reports feeling close to any political party. It is less plausible that past receipt of benefits would make someone feel close to a party for which they have no previous preference. Second, we construct a predicted measure of closeness to party based on how the respondent answers three ideological questions on welfare and minority rights that enable us to position them on a scale from very liberal to very conservative in the Hungary context. While past exposure to benefits may make someone feel closer to a political party, it is much less plausible that past benefits would change voters' stances on fundamental policy questions. Our main finding that negative inducements are targeted on core supporters is robust to both of these alternative measures of closeness to party.

B.1 Analysis of closeness to party as a categorical variable

One question of substantive interest is whether the correlation between the continuous version of closeness to party and negative forms of clientelism are driven by any particular contrasts between the levels of closeness to party. Closeness to party is constructed as a four-category variable, with the lowest category indicating that the respondent does not feel close to any political party, and three subsequent levels based on a follow-up question asking respondents who did feel close to a party how close they felt (not very close, somewhat close, or very close).

In Table B1, we recreate the analysis in Table 2 with Core and Income treated as categorical variables.

Figure B2 plots the coefficients on the four levels of closeness to party for each of the four dependent variables of interest. These coefficients are from the specifications in Columns 2, 4, 6, and 8 of Table B1, which include controls.

Figure B2 and Table B1 show that although the prevalence of the two positive strategies (in the top panel, in green) is not consistently increasing with closeness to party, the prevalence of the negative forms of clientelism is. In each subfigure, the base category is no political affiliation. The top two subfigures show that in the case of vote buying and mayor favors there are no statistically significant differences between voters who are not close to any party and those who do feel close to a party. In addition, in the case of mayor favors, those who are very close to a political party are actually the least likely to experience that form of clientelism, though the difference is indistinguishable from zero. By contrast, for the two negative forms of clientelism, people who feel very close to a political party are significantly more likely to experience welfare pressure (true “core supporters”) and lender pressure than those with no party affiliation (true “swing voters”).

Next we examine the relationship between the categorical measure of closeness to party and access to entitlements.

The categorical analysis of access to entitlements shows that the coefficients on all levels of closeness to party are positive as compared to the base case of no party affiliation. In the case of access to credit, the strongest supporters are more than 20 percentage points more likely to receive

Table B1: Closeness to party and exposure to clientelism during the election - Categorical

		<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
		Vote Buying		Mayor Favor		Welfare Pressure		Lender Pressure	
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Sensitive Item	Core - Not very	-0.033 (0.08)	-0.04 (0.08)	0.034 (0.06)	0.017 (0.07)	-0.017 (0.07)	-0.015 (0.07)	0.096* (0.06)	0.1 (0.06)
	Core - Somewhat	-0.006 (0.05)	-0.018 (0.05)	0.07 (0.05)	0.051 (0.06)	-0.024 (0.05)	-0.007 (0.05)	0.115** (0.05)	0.131*** (0.05)
	Core - Very	0.074 (0.06)	0.08 (0.07)	0.05 (0.07)	-0.002 (0.07)	0.062 (0.06)	0.125* (0.07)	0.137** (0.06)	0.161** (0.07)
	Age		0.003 (0.03)		0.031 (0.03)		0.007 (0.03)		-0.002 (0.02)
	Roma		-0.001 (0.07)		-0.043 (0.07)		0.006 (0.07)		0.032 (0.06)
	Female		0.009 (0.05)		0.035 (0.05)		0.05 (0.05)		0.047 (0.05)
	Income - Medium		0.021 (0.09)		-0.088 (0.11)		0.049 (0.09)		0.034 (0.09)
	Income - High		-0.014 (0.09)		-0.146 (0.11)		0.12 (0.1)		0.062 (0.09)
	(Intercept)	0.054 (0.04)	0.059 (0.1)	0.014 (0.04)	0.141 (0.11)	0.073* (0.04)	-0.066 (0.1)	-0.036 (0.04)	-0.127 (0.09)
	Control Items	Core - Not very	0.078* (0.05)	0.059 (0.05)	0.011 (0.04)	0.002 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.003 (0.04)
Core - Somewhat		0.06** (0.03)	0.053 (0.03)	-0.008 (0.04)	-0.007 (0.04)	0.039 (0.03)	0.026 (0.03)	-0.017 (0.03)	-0.032 (0.03)
Core - Very		0.206*** (0.04)	0.213*** (0.04)	0.262*** (0.04)	0.301*** (0.05)	0.173*** (0.04)	0.153*** (0.04)	0.169*** (0.04)	0.145*** (0.04)
Age			-0.037** (0.02)		-0.029 (0.02)		-0.007 (0.02)		-0.008 (0.02)
Roma			-0.059 (0.04)		-0.019 (0.05)		0.008 (0.04)		0.039 (0.04)
Female			-0.008 (0.03)		0.003 (0.04)		-0.014 (0.03)		-0.02 (0.03)
Income - Medium			0.064 (0.06)		0.165** (0.07)		0.019 (0.04)		0.129*** (0.05)
Income - High			0.217*** (0.07)		0.315*** (0.07)		0.114*** (0.04)		0.196*** (0.04)
(Intercept)		0.957*** (0.02)	0.835*** (0.07)	0.896*** (0.03)	0.648*** (0.08)	0.952*** (0.02)	0.901*** (0.04)	1.048*** (0.02)	0.904*** (0.05)
Observations		1357	1193	1345	1184	1346	1182	1346	1181

Standard errors in parentheses.

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

The outcome in Columns 1-2 is the response to the list containing vote buying; the outcome in Columns 3-4 is the response to the list containing mayor favors; the outcome in 5-6 is the response to the list including welfare pressure; and the outcome in 7-8 is the response to the list containing lender pressure. Core is a four-category variable indicating how close the respondent feels to their preferred political party, with no affiliation as the base case. Age is a standardized three-category measure of age. Roma and Female are dummy variables indicating whether the respondent presents as being from the Roma ethnic group and female, respectively. Both are identified by the enumerator. Income is a three-category measure of income for the household, with the lowest income category as the base case.

Table B2: Closeness to party and access to entitlements - Categorical


	<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
	Credit		Welfare		Workfare		Entitlements Index	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Core - Cat 1	0.106** (0.044)	0.085** (0.043)	0.070* (0.042)	0.072* (0.038)	0.031* (0.017)	0.033* (0.018)	0.133*** (0.046)	0.120*** (0.041)
Core - Cat 2	0.103*** (0.034)	0.062* (0.035)	0.066** (0.033)	0.027 (0.030)	0.014 (0.014)	0.007 (0.015)	0.118*** (0.035)	0.059* (0.033)
Core - Cat 3	0.272*** (0.035)	0.211*** (0.036)	0.073** (0.034)	0.044 (0.032)	0.046*** (0.014)	0.049*** (0.015)	0.270*** (0.036)	0.206*** (0.035)
Age		-0.101*** (0.014)		-0.146*** (0.012)		-0.015*** (0.006)		-0.182*** (0.013)
Roma		0.172*** (0.032)		0.156*** (0.029)		0.016 (0.014)		0.184*** (0.031)
Female		-0.039 (0.027)		0.005 (0.024)		-0.013 (0.012)		-0.030 (0.026)
Income		0.012 (0.013)		-0.107*** (0.012)		-0.023*** (0.006)		-0.043*** (0.013)
(Intercept)	0.254*** (0.026)	0.270*** (0.031)	0.234*** (0.025)	0.227*** (0.028)	0.015 (0.010)	0.025* (0.013)	0.402*** (0.027)	0.414*** (0.030)
Observations	1,367	1,199	1,354	1,188	1,357	1,200	1,359	1,196
R ²	0.044	0.133	0.004	0.242	0.009	0.040	0.040	0.260

Standard errors in parentheses.

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01


The outcome in Columns 1-2 is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the respondent reports currently having access to credit; the outcome in Columns 3-4 is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the respondent reports that someone in their family is currently receiving welfare; the outcome in Columns 5-6 is a binary indicating receipt of either Credit or Welfare. Core is a four-category variable indicating how close the respondent feels to their preferred political party, with no affiliation as the base case. Age is a standardized three-category measure of age. Roma and Female are dummy variables indicating whether the respondent presents as being from the Roma ethnic group and female, respectively. Both are identified by the enumerator. Income is a three-category measure of income for the household, with the lowest income category as the base case.

Figure B2: Estimated incidence of clientelistic strategies by category of closeness to party



credit than unaffiliated voters. In the case of welfare transfers, the three levels of closeness to party are associated with increases of between 3 and 7 percentage points in access to welfare, but this difference is only statistically significant in the case of those who feel only a little bit close to a political party.

Figure B3: Relationship between categorical version of closeness to party and access to entitlements



B.2 Ideology and party affiliation

In this section we assess the robustness of the analyses to two different measures of closeness to party that are plausibly less vulnerable to the threat of bias due to reverse causality. One of these measures is a binary coding of closeness to party that indicates whether or not the respondent feels close to any political party. The second is a predicted measure of closeness to party based on the responses to several more general ideological questions.

Before we show the results of the robustness analysis, we discuss the methodology that we used to create the predicted measure of closeness to party. We created the measure of ideology on a left-right scale using three questions that are relevant in contemporary Hungarian politics:¹

“There are many problems in Hungary, none of which are easy or cheap to solve. In the followings we are going to ask you which of these problems are dealt with too much, too little, or just the right amount by the government.”

- In your opinion, to improve the welfare of the Roma people,
 - the government does too much (1)
 - the government does exactly the necessary steps (0)
 - the government does not do enough (-1)
- There are people who say that those who are poor, are poor because they do not work enough. Others say that someone is poor because of bad conditions. What do you think?
 - People are poor, because they do not work enough (1)
 - Somebody becomes poor because his/her conditions are bad (-1)
- Do you agree that children should be taught together, regardless of their abilities?
 - Agree (-1)
 - Disagree (1)

¹We asked a fourth question on crime but this question was not predictive of ideology and so was dropped from this analysis.

We assign numeric scores to each answer ranging from -1 for liberal to 1 for conservative, and average them over the three questions to get a single measure of ideology on a left-right scale (higher numbers mean more conservative).

This ideological score is strongly related to the political party that respondents prefer. Figure B4 shows that, as expected, supporters of the socialist party MSZP score lower on the ideological scale, the right-wing Jobbik supporters score much higher, while the centrist party Fidesz's supporters fall in between these two (although much closer to the socialist average).

Figure B4: Ideology and party identification




Table B3 shows that where someone falls on this left-right ideological scale predicts how close they feel to their party of choice. Table B3 presents analysis for three different samples: (1) people who support the left-wing party MSZP plus unaffiliated voters, (2) people who support the centrist Fidesz plus unaffiliated voters, and (3) people who support the right-wing Jobbik plus unaffiliated voters. Because ideology should have a different effect in each of these samples (i.e., in

the left-wing sample the more left an individual's ideology is, the closer we would expect her to feel to the left-wing party), we split the sample for the analysis and include unaffiliated voters as the base case in each analysis.² The coefficient of interest in the analysis is Right, the measure of ideology on a left-right scale. Table B3 presents the results of this analysis.

Table B3: Ideology and closeness to party

<i>Dependent variable:</i>						
Core						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Right	-0.078*	-0.039	-0.031	0.068*	0.218***	0.163***
	(0.043)	(0.048)	(0.036)	(0.041)	(0.040)	(0.041)
Female		0.036		0.026		-0.089
		(0.090)		(0.074)		(0.077)
Income		-0.010		0.045		0.021
		(0.043)		(0.037)		(0.038)
Roma		0.303**		0.576***		-0.306***
		(0.120)		(0.087)		(0.113)
Age		0.091*		-0.065*		-0.243***
		(0.052)		(0.038)		(0.041)
(Intercept)	-0.906***	-1.017***	-0.097***	-0.368***	-0.956***	-0.871***
	(0.041)	(0.079)	(0.034)	(0.065)	(0.039)	(0.063)
Observations	477	443	1,020	890	493	447
R ²	0.007	0.023	0.001	0.065	0.058	0.135
Sample	MSZP		Fidesz		Jobbik	

Standard errors in parentheses.

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

The outcome in Columns 1-6 is a standardized measure of closeness to party on a four-point scale. Right is a standardized measure of the average response to the three ideological questions on a left-right scale. Age is a standardized three-category measure of age. Roma and Female are dummy variables indicating whether the respondent presents as being from the Roma ethnic group and female, respectively. Both are identified by the enumerator. Income is a standardized three-category measure of income for the household. The MSZP sample includes all people who self-identified as supporters of the socialist party plus those who support no party. The Fidesz sample includes all people who identified as Fidesz supporters plus those who did not identify a party. The Jobbik sample includes all people who identified as Jobbik supporters plus those who did not identify a party.

Table B3 shows that position on the left-right scale consistently predicts closeness to party in logical ways, although the effects in some cases are only weakly statistically significant. Being further left on the ideological scale is associated with feeling close to the socialist party in the socialist sample. Being further right is weakly associated with closeness to Fidesz, and strongly associated with closeness to the right-wing party Jobbik.

²This is similar to using interaction terms but easier to interpret.

Based on these relationships we create a predicted measure of closeness to party based only on these ideological preferences. We predict closeness to party in a specification using the complete data and interactions between position on the right-left spectrum and a categorical version of party affiliation:

$$Core = \beta_1 Right + \beta_2 Right \times Party + Party + \varepsilon$$

This measure is strongly predictive of actual closeness to party in the full sample as well as all of the party subsamples ($p < 0.001$ in all cases). We will use this predicted measure of closeness to party in the following section as an alternative independent variable of interest that is less sensitive to the threat of reverse causality.

B.3 Robustness to alternative measures of closeness to party

In this section we use two other measures of closeness to party that are less likely to be biased by a reverse causal effect of clientelism on closeness to party. First, we use a binary measure of closeness to party that is coded as 1 if an individual reports that they feel close to any party. Second, we use the predicted measure of closeness to party based only on the responses to the three ideological questions discussed in the previous section. While past exposure to benefits may make someone feel closer to a political party that they already identify with, it is much less plausible that past benefits would change someone's partisan identification altogether or change a voter's stance on fundamental policy questions. Table B4 presents the results of both of these analyses.

Table B4: Alternative measures of closeness to party and exposure to clientelism during the election

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
	Vote Buying		Mayor Favor		Welfare Pressure		Lender Pressure	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Core (Original)	0.025 (0.02)	0.025 (0.02)	0.018 (0.02)	0 (0.03)	0.023 (0.02)	0.044* (0.02)	0.053** (0.02)	0.063*** (0.02)
Observations	1357	1193	1345	1184	1346	1182	1346	1181
Core (Binary)	0.015 (0.05)	0.007 (0.05)	0.048 (0.05)	0.014 (0.05)	0.017 (0.05)	0.045 (0.05)	0.126*** (0.04)	0.144*** (0.05)
Observations	1357	1193	1345	1184	1346	1182	1346	1181
Core (Predicted)	0.005 (0.02)	0.003 (0.02)	0.015 (0.02)	0 (0.02)	0.006 (0.02)	0.015 (0.02)	0.057*** (0.02)	0.063*** (0.02)
Observations	1349	1186	1337	1177	1339	1175	1337	1173

Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

The outcome in Columns 1-2 is the response to the list containing vote buying; the outcome in Columns 3-4 is the response to the list containing mayor favors; the outcome in 5-6 is the response to the list including welfare pressure; and the outcome in 7-8 is the response to the list containing lender pressure. Core (Binary) takes a value of 1 if the respondent identifies with any political party. Core (Predicted) is the standardized predicted value of core based on how the respondent answered three questions on her political ideology. Age is a standardized three-category measure of age. Roma and Female are dummy variables indicating whether the respondent presents as being from the Roma ethnic group and female, respectively. Both are identified by the enumerator. Income is a standardized three-category measure of income for the household. The results shown here are only the coefficients of interest for the original measure of closeness to party (top panel), the binary measure (middle panel) and the predicted measure based on ideology (bottom panel). All models also include the same controls as in the corresponding columns of Table 2.

Table B4 shows that the main results, particularly those on lender pressure, are very robust to

these alternative measures of closeness to party. In the specifications using binary measure to predict lender pressure, the magnitude of the coefficient increase two-fold compared to the specifications using the continuous measure (Columns 7-8 of the middle panel). In the specifications using the predicted value of closeness to party, the coefficients on closeness to party in the specifications predicting lender pressure become slightly larger in magnitude and remain significant at the 1% level (Columns 7-8 of the bottom panel). The coefficients in the specifications using welfare pressure are less robust. While significant at the 10% level in the main specification (Columns 5-6 of the top panel), they lose their significant and some magnitude in the specifications using the alternative measures (Columns 5-6 of the middle and bottom panels). Closeness to party consistently does not explain exposure to positive inducements like vote buying and mayor favors (Columns 1-2 and 3-4).

Similarly, the results presented in Table 3 are also robust to these alternative measures of closeness to party.

Table B5: Alternative measures of closeness to party and access to entitlements

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
	Credit		Welfare		Workfare		Entitlements Index	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Core (Original)	0.094*** (0.013)	0.070*** (0.013)	0.026** (0.012)	0.012 (0.012)	0.015*** (0.005)	0.014*** (0.006)	0.093*** (0.013)	0.066*** (0.013)
Observations	1,367	1,199	1,354	1,188	1,357	1,200	1,359	1,196
Core (Binary)	0.168*** (0.030)	0.119*** (0.030)	0.069** (0.028)	0.042 (0.026)	0.029** (0.012)	0.027** (0.013)	0.179*** (0.031)	0.124*** (0.029)
Observations	1,367	1,199	1,354	1,188	1,357	1,200	1,359	1,196
Core (Predicted)	0.072*** (0.013)	0.048*** (0.013)	0.029** (0.012)	0.014 (0.012)	0.012** (0.005)	0.011** (0.006)	0.074*** (0.013)	0.047*** (0.013)
Observations	1,358	1,191	1,345	1,180	1,348	1,192	1,350	1,188

Standard errors in parentheses.

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

The outcome in Columns 1-2 is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the respondent reports currently having access to credit; the outcome in Columns 3-4 is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the respondent reports that someone in their family is currently receiving welfare; the outcome in Columns 7-8 is a dummy variable indicating receipt of Credit, Welfare, or Workfare. Core is a standardized four-category variable indicating how close the respondent feels to their preferred political party. Age is a standardized three-category measure of age. Roma and Female are dummy variables indicating whether the respondent presents as being from the Roma ethnic group and female, respectively. Both are identified by the enumerator. Income is a standardized three-category measure of income for the household.

C Interpretation of entitlements results

C.1 Are core voters getting more or swing voters getting less than they deserve?

Although either case would be consistent with our theory, it may be of substantive interest to know whether the correlation between closeness to party and access to entitlements is driven by core supporters getting access to more benefits than they deserve or swing voters getting access to less. Although we do not have all of the information needed to precisely assess eligibility for entitlements, we can look at patterns in the data that would be suggestive of each of these types of favoritism. In this section we focus on access to welfare because it has clear eligibility criteria as compared to informal credit.

First, if core supporters were getting access to more welfare transfers than they are entitled to receive, then we should expect to see people in the sample who report receiving welfare but have characteristics that make them ineligible, such as being over the retirement age or fully employed.³ Almost 18% of voters who are either fully employed or over the retirement age, and thus are ineligible for workfare benefits, are receiving some form of welfare assistance. However, the likelihood of receiving welfare for this group is not consistently related to closeness to party: while the lowest rate of welfare access for these “ineligible” voters is true swing voters (14%), the highest rate of welfare access is voters who are only weakly affiliated with a political party (22%).⁴ No one over retirement age reported the workfare program as their primary occupation, which would be a clear violation of the workfare policy. Overall, this analysis suggests that core supporters are not getting access to significant amounts of welfare transfers to which they are not entitled.


By contrast, in order to look for suggestive evidence that swing voters are being excluded from

³These are characteristics that would make people ineligible for the workfare program, which is the most important welfare transfer in the localities in our study. However, because the welfare survey question asked respondents about workfare or other types of welfare benefits like heating assistance, people with these characteristics are not necessarily receiving welfare to which they are not entitled.

⁴By comparison, 17 and 19% of voters who are somewhat or very close to a political party, respectively, receive welfare benefits.

benefits that they should be receiving, we can look at the rate of access to welfare transfers among voters who are eligible for the workfare program, broken down by closeness to party. About half of voters who are under retirement age and not fully employed receive some welfare benefits, and the proportion of these eligible voters who receive welfare increases monotonically with closeness to party. Similarly, there is an upward trend in the proportion of voters under retirement age who report that the workfare program is their primary current occupation. Figure C5 plots the proportion of these eligible voters who receive any kind of welfare benefits (on the left) and report that the workfare program is their primary occupation (on the right).

Figure C5: Proportion of eligible voters who receive social policy transfers



In short, although we do not have precise data that would allow us to identify eligibility for welfare or workfare transfers, this analysis suggests that the observed correlation between closeness to party and receipt of welfare benefits is driven more by swing voters being excluded from benefits for which they may be eligible than core supporters receiving benefits that they should not legally receive.

C.2 Disaggregated entitlements results

In this section we also present additional results related to the discussion of closeness to party and access to long-term entitlements discussed in Section 5.3.1. Table C6 presents the results from Table 4 with the entitlements index broken down into separate dummy variables measuring whether the respondent currently has access to credit, welfare, and the workfare program.

Table C6 shows that the coefficients on each individual entitlement are usually positively correlated with election-time negative inducements, but are mostly not statistically significant when analyzed individually. Welfare (measured as any type of welfare received by the household) is positively associated with welfare pressure, and is significant at the 10% level. However, reporting the workfare program as one's primary occupation actually has a negative (though far from statistically significant) coefficient in the analysis of welfare pressure. Being in debt is positively associated with experiencing election-time lender pressure, although this variable is not statistically significant on its own.

Table C6: Closeness to party and exposure to clientelism during the election

		<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
		Vote Buying		Mayor Favor		Welfare Pressure		Lender Pressure	
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Sensitive Item	Welfare	0.005 (0.04)	0.028 (0.05)	0.019 (0.04)	0.07 (0.05)	0.043 (0.04)	0.088* (0.05)	0.033 (0.04)	0.038 (0.05)
	Workfare	-0.015 (0.1)	0.035 (0.1)	-0.059 (0.08)	-0.044 (0.09)	-0.007 (0.09)	-0.032 (0.09)	0.066 (0.11)	0.07 (0.12)
	Debt	0.07 (0.04)	0.061 (0.05)	0.046 (0.04)	0.035 (0.05)	0.063 (0.04)	0.075 (0.05)	0.044 (0.04)	0.044 (0.04)
	Age		0.022 (0.02)		0.045* (0.03)		0.011 (0.02)		0.004 (0.02)
	Roma		-0.002 (0.06)		-0.025 (0.06)		-0.003 (0.06)		0.058 (0.05)
	Female		0.004 (0.04)		0.043 (0.04)		0.037 (0.04)		0.029 (0.04)
	Income		0.008 (0.02)		-0.019 (0.02)		0.033* (0.02)		0.007 (0.02)
	(Intercept)	0.041* (0.02)	0.036 (0.04)	0.028 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.04)	0.024 (0.02)	-0.014 (0.03)	0.026 (0.02)	-0.006 (0.04)
	Control Items	Welfare	-0.103*** (0.02)	-0.097*** (0.03)	-0.151*** (0.03)	-0.166*** (0.03)	-0.103*** (0.02)	-0.106*** (0.03)	-0.083*** (0.02)
Workfare		0.055 (0.06)	0.027 (0.06)	0.094** (0.05)	0.098* (0.05)	0.001 (0.06)	0.008 (0.06)	0.043 (0.07)	0.057 (0.07)
Debt		0.125*** (0.03)	0.117*** (0.03)	0.136*** (0.03)	0.138*** (0.03)	0.122*** (0.03)	0.109*** (0.03)	0.128*** (0.03)	0.115*** (0.03)
Age			-0.032** (0.01)		-0.028* (0.02)		-0.002 (0.01)		0.011 (0.01)
Roma			-0.017 (0.04)		0.025 (0.04)		0.04 (0.03)		0.052 (0.03)
Female			-0.008 (0.03)		-0.015 (0.03)		-0.012 (0.02)		-0.012 (0.02)
Income			0.059*** (0.01)		0.063*** (0.01)		0.036*** (0.01)		0.051*** (0.01)
(Intercept)		1.029*** (0.02)	1.041*** (0.03)	0.969*** (0.02)	0.971*** (0.03)	1.005*** (0.01)	1.007*** (0.02)	1.057*** (0.01)	1.045*** (0.02)
Observations		1784	1536	1762	1527	1762	1520	1780	1531

Standard errors in parentheses.

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

The outcome in Columns 1-2 is the response to the list containing vote buying; the outcome in Columns 3-4 is the response to the list containing mayor favors; the outcome in 5-6 is the response to the list including welfare pressure; and the outcome in 7-8 is the response to the list containing lender pressure. Welfare, Workfare, and Credit are dummy variables that take a value of 1 if the respondent receives welfare, workfare, or credit, respectively. Age is a standardized three-category measure of age. Roma and Female are dummy variables indicating whether the respondent presents as being from the Roma ethnic group and female, respectively. Both are identified by the enumerator. Income is a standardized three-category measure of income for the household.

D Additional results on co-partisanship

Table D7 shows that co-partisans of the mayor are also more likely to receive access to entitlements. These results are robust to the inclusion of controls in the case of credit and access to the workfare program.

Table D7: Mayor co-partisanship and access to entitlements

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
	Credit		Welfare		Workfare		Entitlements Index	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Mayor Co-Partisan	0.102*** (0.031)	0.080** (0.032)	0.069** (0.030)	0.035 (0.028)	0.035*** (0.012)	0.031** (0.013)	0.088*** (0.032)	0.049 (0.031)
Age		-0.103*** (0.014)		-0.147*** (0.012)		-0.015*** (0.006)		-0.183*** (0.013)
Roma		0.184*** (0.032)		0.153*** (0.028)		0.017 (0.013)		0.202*** (0.031)
Female		-0.038 (0.028)		0.002 (0.024)		-0.014 (0.011)		-0.031 (0.026)
Income		0.013 (0.014)		-0.108*** (0.012)		-0.023*** (0.006)		-0.042*** (0.013)
(Intercept)	0.358*** (0.015)	0.338*** (0.024)	0.275*** (0.014)	0.256*** (0.021)	0.030*** (0.006)	0.038*** (0.010)	0.520*** (0.015)	0.493*** (0.023)
Observations	1,386	1,211	1,374	1,201	1,377	1,213	1,379	1,209
R ²	0.008	0.109	0.004	0.238	0.006	0.033	0.005	0.237

Standard errors in parentheses.

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

The outcome in Columns 1-2 is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the respondent reports currently having access to credit; the outcome in Columns 3-4 is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the respondent reports that someone in their family is currently receiving welfare; the outcome in Columns 7-8 is a dummy variable indicating receipt of Credit, Welfare, or Workfare. Mayor Co-Partisan is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the respondent reports being close to the same political party as her mayor. Age is a standardized three-category measure of age. Roma and Female are dummy variables indicating whether the respondent presents as being from the Roma ethnic group and female, respectively. Both are identified by the enumerator. Income is a standardized three-category measure of income for the household.

E Missingness

In this section we assess the extent to which our results could be biased by non-random missingness in our data. There are two variables for which we have high levels of missingness: Core and Income. In our main analyses, we drop all observations for which one of the variables in the specification is missing. In this section we first assess the correlates of missingness to determine which respondents are being dropped from our sample, and second we use multiple imputation to check the robustness of our results to specifications that include all observations.

Table E8: Correlates of missingness in closeness to party and income

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Core - Missing		Income - Missing	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Age	-0.035*** (0.011)	-0.039*** (0.012)	-0.007 (0.007)	-0.008 (0.008)
Roma	-0.099*** (0.026)	-0.090*** (0.027)	-0.069*** (0.018)	-0.057*** (0.018)
Female	-0.002 (0.022)	0.002 (0.022)	-0.020 (0.015)	-0.021 (0.015)
Conservative	-0.073*** (0.011)	-0.070*** (0.011)	-0.051*** (0.007)	-0.051*** (0.008)
Credit		-0.066*** (0.023)		-0.051*** (0.015)
Welfare		0.018 (0.025)		0.010 (0.017)
(Intercept)	0.295*** (0.018)	0.308*** (0.021)	0.129*** (0.012)	0.139*** (0.014)
Observations	1,742	1,720	1,742	1,720
R ²	0.032	0.037	0.030	0.039

Standard errors in parentheses.

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

The outcome in Columns 1-2 is a dummy variable indicating whether the measure of closeness to party is missing, while the outcome in Columns 3-4 is a dummy variable indicating whether income is missing. Welfare and Credit are dummy variables that take a value of 1 if the respondent receives welfare or credit, respectively. Age is a standardized three-category measure of age. Roma and Female are dummy variables indicating whether the respondent presents as being from the Roma ethnic group and female, respectively. Both are identified by the enumerator. Conservative is a standardized measure of the respondent's ideology on a left-right scale, with higher values indicating more conservative policy preferences. Income is a standardized three-category measure of income for the household.

Table E8 shows that missingness is not completely at random, suggesting that list-wise deletion may be introducing bias into our analysis. Missingness patterns are somewhat similar across both variables: data is less likely to be missing for Roma, for people who are more conservative in their political opinions, and for those who are in debt. Older people are more likely to reveal their closeness to party but no more likely to reveal their income, and there are no systematic differences in missingness by gender or welfare status.

Next, we use a multiple imputation procedure (King et al., 2001; Honaker, King and Blackwell, 2011) to impute values for all of the missing observations in our data and check the robustness of our core analyses. Multiple imputation rests on the assumption that data are missing at random, conditional on the observed data. In other words, the pattern of missingness M must depend only on the observed data D^{obs} and not the unobserved D^{mis} , or $p(M|D) = p(M|D^{obs})$.

To implement the King et al. (2001) imputation procedure, we use all of the variables in our data to impute the missing values.⁵ Tables E9, E10, and E11 show that the results based on the imputed data are very similar to our main analyses presented in Tables 2, 3, and 4. Specifically, the conclusions of the tests of the relationship between closeness to party and exposure to clientelism in Table E9 are unchanged. In Table E10, the results on access to credit are the substantively the same, but the results on access to welfare lose magnitude and significance with the imputed data. In Table E11, the results are substantively unchanged, although the magnitudes of the coefficients for the statistically insignificant positive forms of clientelism are substantively different than in the original data.

⁵Specifically, we include household income, employment category, a debt dummy, a welfare dummy, party identification, closeness to party, four policy preferences, a measure of perceived discrimination, measures of generosity and reciprocity, whether the respondent voted, whether they believe their vote to be secret, gender, age, ethnicity, the list experiment treatment indicators, the list experiment responses, and their municipality.

Table E9: Closeness to party and exposure to clientelism during the election with imputed data

		<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
		Vote Buying		Mayor Favor		Welfare Pressure		Lender Pressure	
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Sensitive Item	Core	0.01 (0.02)	0.006 (0.02)	0.007 (0.02)	0.006 (0.02)	0.019 (0.02)	0.024 (0.02)	0.063*** (0.02)	0.064*** (0.02)
	Age		0.009 (0.02)		0.038* (0.02)		0.004 (0.02)		-0.001 (0.02)
	Roma		0.001 (0.05)		-0.009 (0.05)		-0.015 (0.05)		0.064 (0.05)
	Female		-0.015 (0.04)		0.057 (0.04)		0.073* (0.04)		0.039 (0.04)
	Income		-0.003 (0.02)		-0.007 (0.02)		0.026 (0.02)		0.013 (0.02)
	(Intercept)	0.068*** (0.02)	0.078** (0.03)	0.06*** (0.02)	0.027 (0.03)	0.068*** (0.02)	0.028 (0.03)	0.04** (0.02)	0 (0.03)
	Core	0.068*** (0.01)	0.073*** (0.01)	0.083*** (0.01)	0.087*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)	0.049*** (0.01)	0.034*** (0.01)	0.031** (0.01)
Age		-0.03** (0.01)		-0.025* (0.01)		0 (0.01)		0.002 (0.01)	
Roma		-0.048 (0.03)		-0.025 (0.04)		0.008 (0.03)		0.03 (0.03)	
Female		-0.006 (0.03)		-0.019 (0.03)		-0.003 (0.02)		-0.007 (0.02)	
Income		0.067*** (0.01)		0.059*** (0.01)		0.041*** (0.01)		0.055*** (0.01)	
(Intercept)	1.045*** (0.01)	1.06*** (0.02)	0.97*** (0.01)	0.989*** (0.02)	1.011*** (0.01)	1.011*** (0.02)	1.08*** (0.01)	1.077*** (0.02)	
Observations	1860	1860	1860	1860	1860	1860	1860	1860	

Standard errors in parentheses.

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

The outcome in Columns 1-2 is the response to the list containing vote buying; the outcome in Columns 3-4 is the response to the list containing mayor favors; the outcome in 5-6 is the response to the list including welfare pressure; and the outcome in 7-8 is the response to the list containing lender pressure. The data includes values imputed using the multiple imputation procedure described in (King et al., 2001). Core is a standardized four-category variable indicating how close the respondent feels to their preferred political party. Age is a standardized three-category measure of age. Roma and Female are dummy variables indicating whether the respondent presents as being from the Roma ethnic group and female, respectively. Both are identified by the enumerator. Income is a standardized three-category measure of income for the household.

Table E10: Closeness to party and access to entitlements with imputed data

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
	Credit		Welfare		Workfare		Entitlements Index	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Core	0.090*** (0.011)	0.077*** (0.011)	0.014 (0.011)	-0.008 (0.010)	0.012*** (0.004)	0.010** (0.004)	0.076*** (0.011)	0.054*** (0.011)
Age		-0.068*** (0.011)		-0.134*** (0.010)		-0.019*** (0.005)		-0.153*** (0.011)
Roma		0.157*** (0.026)		0.180*** (0.023)		0.011 (0.011)		0.196*** (0.025)
Female		-0.005 (0.022)		-0.006 (0.020)		-0.022** (0.009)		-0.022 (0.022)
Income		0.025** (0.011)		-0.096*** (0.010)		-0.018*** (0.005)		-0.030*** (0.011)
(Intercept)	0.361*** (0.011)	0.323*** (0.019)	0.303*** (0.011)	0.259*** (0.017)	0.039*** (0.004)	0.050*** (0.008)	0.530*** (0.011)	0.493*** (0.018)
Observations	1,860	1,860	1,860	1,860	1,860	1,860	1,860	1,860
R ²	0.035	0.087	0.001	0.205	0.004	0.029	0.023	0.187

Standard errors in parentheses.

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

The outcome in Columns 1-2 is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the respondent reports currently having access to credit; the outcome in Columns 3-4 is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the respondent reports that someone in their family is currently receiving welfare; the outcome in Columns 5-6 is a binary indicating participation in the workfare program; and the outcome in Columns 7-8 is a binary indicating receipt of either Credit, Welfare, or Workfare. The data includes values imputed using the multiple imputation procedure described in (King et al., 2001). Core is a standardized four-category variable indicating how close the respondent feels to their preferred political party. Age is a standardized three-category measure of age. Roma and Female are dummy variables indicating whether the respondent presents as being from the Roma ethnic group and female, respectively. Both are identified by the enumerator. Income is a standardized three-category measure of income for the household.

Table E11: Access to entitlements and exposure to clientelism during the election with imputed data

		<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
		Vote Buying		Mayor Favor		Welfare Pressure		Lender Pressure	
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Sensitive Item	Entitlements Index	0.072*	0.084*	0.01	0.044	0.074**	0.11***	0.064*	0.062
		(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
	Age		0.025		0.048**		0.018		0.004
			(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.02)
	Roma		-0.013		-0.012		-0.033		0.069
			(0.05)		(0.06)		(0.05)		(0.05)
	Female		-0.017		0.055		0.079**		0.046
		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)	
Income		-0.001		-0.003		0.03		0.015	
		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.02)	
(Intercept)		0.029	0.038	0.052*	0.004	0.03	-0.03	0.007	-0.039
		(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)
Control Items	Entitlements Index	0.068***	0.086***	0.07**	0.08**	0.045**	0.054**	0.067***	0.082***
		(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
	Age		-0.019		-0.015		0.008		0.015
			(0.01)		(0.02)		(0.01)		(0.01)
	Roma		-0.045		-0.017		0.013		0.023
			(0.03)		(0.04)		(0.03)		(0.03)
	Female		0		-0.014		-0.001		-0.006
		(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.02)		(0.02)	
Income		0.069***		0.06***		0.043***		0.056***	
		(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.01)	
(Intercept)		1.009***	1.011***	0.934***	0.941***	0.987***	0.979***	1.045***	1.036***
		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Observations		1860	1860	1860	1860	1860	1860	1860	1860

Standard errors in parentheses.

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

The outcome in Columns 1-2 is the response to the list containing vote buying; the outcome in Columns 3-4 is the response to the list containing mayor favors; the outcome in 5-6 is the response to the list including welfare pressure; and the outcome in 7-8 is the response to the list containing lender pressure. The data includes values imputed using the multiple imputation procedure described in (King et al., 2001). Entitlements Index is a binary variable that takes a value of 1 if the respondent receives either credit nor welfare. Age is a standardized three-category measure of age. Roma and Female are dummy variables indicating whether the respondent presents as being from the Roma ethnic group and female, respectively. Both are identified by the enumerator. Income is a standardized three-category measure of income for the household.

Table E12: Co-partisanship with the mayor and election-time inducements with imputed data

		<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
		Vote Buying		Mayor Favor		Welfare Pressure		Lender Pressure	
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Sensitive Item	Mayor Co-Partisan	-0.068 (0.05)	-0.079 (0.05)	-0.092* (0.05)	-0.101* (0.05)	0.044 (0.05)	0.047 (0.05)	0.13** (0.05)	0.125** (0.05)
	Age		0.007 (0.02)		0.037* (0.02)		0.004 (0.02)		-0.002 (0.02)
	Roma		0.018 (0.05)		0.012 (0.05)		-0.018 (0.05)		0.064 (0.05)
	Female		-0.012 (0.04)		0.058 (0.04)		0.074* (0.04)		0.041 (0.04)
	Income		0.004 (0.02)		0.001 (0.02)		0.021 (0.02)		0.007 (0.02)
	(Intercept)	0.077*** (0.02)	0.083** (0.03)	0.072*** (0.02)	0.034 (0.04)	0.064*** (0.02)	0.023 (0.03)	0.02 (0.02)	-0.021 (0.03)
	Control Items	Mayor Co-Partisan	0.11*** (0.04)	0.108*** (0.04)	0.167*** (0.04)	0.163*** (0.04)	0.066** (0.03)	0.056** (0.03)	0.088*** (0.03)
Age			-0.03** (0.01)		-0.025* (0.01)		0 (0.01)		0.002 (0.01)
Roma			-0.04 (0.03)		-0.019 (0.04)		0.02 (0.03)		0.034 (0.03)
Female			-0.006 (0.03)		-0.021 (0.03)		-0.005 (0.02)		-0.011 (0.02)
Income			0.062*** (0.01)		0.052*** (0.01)		0.041*** (0.01)		0.053*** (0.01)
(Intercept)		1.025*** (0.01)	1.04*** (0.02)	0.94*** (0.01)	0.958*** (0.02)	0.996*** (0.01)	0.996*** (0.02)	1.061*** (0.01)	1.062*** (0.02)
Observations		1860	1860	1860	1860	1860	1860	1860	1860

Standard errors in parentheses.

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

The outcome in Columns 1-2 is the response to the list containing vote buying; the outcome in Columns 3-4 is the response to the list containing mayor favors; the outcome in 5-6 is the response to the list including welfare pressure; and the outcome in 7-8 is the response to the list containing lender pressure. The data includes values imputed using the multiple imputation procedure described in (King et al., 2001). Age is a standardized three-category measure of age. Roma and Female are dummy variables indicating whether the respondent presents as being from the Roma ethnic group and female, respectively. Both are identified by the enumerator. Income is a standardized three-category measure of income for the household.

F List of qualitative interviews

Table F13 presents a list of the qualitative interviews that we conducted in Hungary as part of our broader research on clientelism in the region. The methodology and full analysis of these interviews is presented in Mares and Young (2017).

Table F13: List of locality interviewees in Hungary

Loc.	County	No.	Date	Gender	Age	Ethnicity	Description
V	Baranya	1	23/3/2014	M	40	Hungarian	Lawyer in NGO providing legal services to Roma minority
V	Baranya	2	23/3/2014	F	40	Roma	Employee local kindergarten
V	Baranya	3	23/3/2014	M	40	Roma	Employee local kindergarten
P	BAZ	1	7/21/15	F	40	Hungarian	Owner of second hand shop, supporter of current mayor
P	BAZ	2	7/21/15	F	29	Hungarian	Public work employee, supporter of current mayor
P	BAZ	3	7/27/15	M	30	Hungarian	Son of the former mayor
P	BAZ	4	7/27/15	F	40	Hungarian	Employee in Kindergarten, supporter of current mayor
P	BAZ	5	7/27/15	M	50	Hungarian	Tractor driver, supporter of mayor
P	BAZ	6	7/27/15	F	30	Hungarian	Director of kindergarten, supporter of current mayor
P	BAZ	7	7/22/15	M	33	Hungarian	Current mayor, Independent
P	BAZ	8	7/22/15	M	40	Hungarian	Bartender, Supporter of former mayor
P	BAZ	9	7/22/15	M	70	Hungarian	Former employee in cooperative, Supporter of former mayor
P	BAZ	10	7/22/15	M	70	Roma	Former employee in chemical factory in Budapest, Supporter of former mayor
P	BAZ	11	7/23/15	M	40	Roma	Leader of public brigade and security guard at municipality, supporter of current mayor
P	BAZ	12	7/23/15	F	40	Hungarian	Wife of pastor

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Table F13 – *Continued from previous page*

Loc.	County	No.	Date	Gender	Age	Ethnicity	Description
P	BAZ	13	7/23/15	F	40	Hungarian	Employee at cultural center, Broker for current mayor
P	BAZ	14	7/23/15	M	70	Hungarian	Former mayor between 2006-2010, Fidesz supporter
P	BAZ	15	7/23/15	M	40	Roma	Representative of Roma minority in municipality
P	BAZ	16	7/24/15	F	40	Roma	Representative of Roma minority in municipality, supporter of current mayor
P	BAZ	17	7/24/15	M	40	Roma	Representative of Roma minority in municipality, supporter of current mayor
O	BAZ	1	23/10/15	M	50	Roma	Employee of municipality
O	BAZ	2	23/10/15	F		Roma	Employee in the public works program
O	BAZ	3	24/10/15	M	60	Hungarian	Former candidate for mayoral position
O	BAZ	4	24/10/15	F	50	Roma	Employee in public works program
O	BAZ	5	24/10/15	M	60	Hungarian	Farmer
I	BAZ	1	7/22/15	F	50	Hungarian	Director of elementary school in locality
I	BAZ	2	7/22/15	M	60	Hungarian	Member in village council. Former deputy mayor, Former MZSP activist
I	BAZ	3	7/23/15	F	50	Hungarian	Employee in local administration
I	BAZ	4	7/23/15	F	30	Hungarian	Head of social policy department in municipality
I	BAZ	5	7/23/15	M	50	Hungarian	Coordinator of public works program in the municipality
I	BAZ	6	7/23/15	M	55	Hungarian	Former member of city council, Opposition
I	BAZ	7	7/25/15	M	35	Roma	Member of Roma Minority council
I	BAZ	8	7/25/15	F	55	Roma	President of Roma Minority Council
I	BAZ	9	7/26/15	M	40	Roma	Former MZSP activist, Former leader of public works program
M	Heves	1	7/29/15	F	40	Hungarian	Secretary of agricultural cooperative, Former deputy mayor

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Table F13 – *Continued from previous page*

Loc.	County	No.	Date	Gender	Age	Ethnicity	Description
M	Heves	2	7/29/15	M	40	Hungarian	Head of social policy department in municipality
M	Heves	3	7/29/15	M	55	Roma	President of Roma Minority Council
M	Heves	4	7/29/15	F	40	Roma	Employee in public works program
M	Heves	5	7/31/16	F	50	Hungarian	Member of village council
M	Heves	6	7/31/15	F	40	Hungarian	Head of social policy department in municipality
M	Heves	7	8/1/15	F	45	Hungarian	Mayor of locality
B	Heves	1	7/28/15	F	30	Hungarian	Employee of municipality, opponent of current mayor
B	Heves	2	7/28/15	F	40	Roma	Employee in public institution, supporter of mayor
B	Heves	3	7/28/15	F	50	Roma	Employee in public works program
B	Heves	4	7/28/15	F	20	Roma	Employee in public works program, supporter of mayor
B	Heves	5	7/29/15	M	50	Hungarian	Employee in public works program
B	Heves	6	7/29/15	F	30	Hungarian	Employee of municipality
B	Heves	7	7/29/15	M	40	Roma	Mayor of locality
B	Heves	8	7/29/15	F	30	Hungarian	Employee in public works program, opponent of mayor
B	Heves	9	7/30/15	M	60	Hungarian	Former mayor
B	Heves	10	7/30/15	M	40	Hungarian	Employee in agriculture, Supporter of mayor
B	Heves	11	7/30/15	M	50	Hungarian	Employee in agriculture
SZ	BAZ	1	7/16/15	M	30	Hungarian	Employee in forestry
SZ	BAZ	2	7/16/15	M	35	Roma	Employee in forestry
SZ	BAZ	3	7/16/15	M	30	Roma	Member of village council
SZ	BAZ	4	7/16/15	M	60	Roma	Retired, Former employee of municipality and former broker of mayor
SZ	BAZ	5	7/18/15	M	70	Hungarian	Retiree, Broker for current mayor

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Table F13 – *Continued from previous page*

Loc.	County	No.	Date	Gender	Age	Ethnicity	Description
SZ	BAZ	6	7/31/15	F	65	Hungarian	Teacher at local school
SZ	BAZ	7	8/20/15	F	65	Hungarian	Retired, Former elementary school teacher and representative in local city council
SZ	BAZ	8	8/20/15	R	60	Roma	Representative of Roma minority in municipality, Former broker
SZ	BAZ	9	8/20/15	R	60	Hungarian	Retired, Former broker for previous mayor
HA	Baranya	1	4/7/15	F	60	Hungarian	Retired
HA	Baranya	2	7/7/15	M	60	Hungarian	Employee in local administration
HA	Baranya	3	7/8/15	M	50	Hungarian	Former council member, now in opposition to mayor
HA	Baranya	4	7/10/15	F	50	Hungarian	School teacher
HA	Baranya	5	7/11/15	M	70	Hungarian	Retired, Former member of city council, Opposition
HA	Baranya	6	7/13/15	M	50	Hungarian	Former member of city council, Opposition
HA	Baranya	7	7/13/15	M	60	Hungarian	Former member of the city council, opposition
K	Heves	1	7/21/15	M	60	Hungarian	Former mayor of locality, now broker
K	Heves	2	7/22/15	F	60	Hungarian	Employee in local city council, Broker, Opposed to mayor
K	Heves	3	7/22/15	F	30	Hungarian	Entrepreneur
K	Heves	4	7/23/15	M	50	Hungarian	President of local water company
K	Heves	5	7/23/15	M	50	Hungarian	President of local power station, former member of city council
K	Heves	6	7/24/15	F	40	Hungarian	Employee of local administration, supporter of mayor
K	Heves	7	7/25/15	F	60	Hungarian	Retired, former school teacher, broker, mayor supporter
S	Baranya	1	7/2/15	F	50	Hungarian	Self-employed
S	Baranya	2	7/3/15	F	80	Hungarian	Retired, active member of MZSP until recently

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Table F13 – *Continued from previous page*

Loc.	County	No.	Date	Gender	Age	Ethnicity	Description
S	Baranya	3	7/4/15	F	60	Hungarian	Self-employed
S	Baranya	4	7/5/15	F	60	Hungarian	Former economist at governmental office, retired
S	Baranya	5	7/6/15	M	30	Hungarian	Employee in local administration
S	Baranya	6	7/7/15	F	60	Hungarian	Retired
S	Baranya	7	7/9/15	M	50	Hungarian	Representative in city council and local leader of MZSP
S	Baranya	8	7/12/15	M	40	Hungarian	Employee in the municipality, former candidate for mayor, broker
S	Baranya	9	7/15/15	M	40	Hungarian	Deputy mayor
NO	Nógrád	1	7/15/15	M	30	Hungarian	Activist who has established an NGO in locality
NO	Nógrád	2	7/15/15	M	60	Roma	Representative of Roma minority in municipality
NO	Nógrád	3	7/16/15	F	35	Hungarian	Owner of local store
NO	Nógrád	4	7/16/15	F	40	Hungarian	Former employee in public works program, now unemployed
NO	Nógrád	5	7/16/15	M	30	Roma	Employee in municipality
NO	Nógrád	6	7/17/15	M	35	Hungarian	Priest in locality
NO	Nógrád	7	7/17/15	M	50	Roma	Voter, unemployed
NO	Nógrád	8	7/20/15	F	50	Hungarian	Employee in municipality
NO	Nógrád	9	7/20/15	F	45	Hungarian	Employee in municipality
NO	Nógrád	10	7/27/15	M	65	Roma	Former candidate for mayoral position
NO	Nógrád	11	7/27/15	F	30	Roma	Voter, President of NGO in locality
NO	Nógrád	12	7/27/15	M	40	Hungarian	Former employee on the mayor's farm
Hi	BAZ	1	10/10/15	M	40	Roma	Representative of Roma minority in municipality
Hi	BAZ	2	10/10/15	M	50	Roma	Former employee in public works program
Hi	BAZ	3	10/11/15	M	50	Roma	Voter, unemployed

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Table F13 – *Continued from previous page*

Loc.	County	No.	Date	Gender	Age	Ethnicity	Description
Hi	BAZ	4	10/11/15	F	50	Hungarian	Retired
Hi	BAZ	5	10/11/15	F	45	Hungarian	Employee in municipality
Hi	BAZ	6	10/22/15	F	55	Hungarian	Employee in municipality
Hi	BAZ	7	10/22/15	M	30	Roma	Employee in public works program
Hi	BAZ	8	10/22/15	M	40	Hungarian	Local notary
HE	BAZ	1	8/21/15	M	55	Roma	Previously held public position, relative of powerful family who controls economic activity in the locality
HE.	BAZ	2	8/21/15	F	60	Roma	Employee in municipality
HE	BAZ	3	8/22/15	M	35	Roma	Employee in municipality
HE	BAZ	4	8/22/15	M	30	Roma	Representative of opposition in municipality government
HE	BAZ	5	8/22/15	F	30	Roma	Teacher at local school
HE	BAZ	6	8/24/15	M	30	Roma	Employee in municipality, relative of powerful family who controls economic activity in the locality
HE	BAZ	7	8/24/15	M	30	Roma	Voter, actively involved in politics
HE	BAZ	8	8/25/15	M	50	Hungarian	Employee in municipality
HE	BAZ	9	8/25/15	M	70	Hungarian	Former mayor
HE	BAZ	10	8/25/15	M	50	Roma	Owner of large agricultural enterprise
HE	BAZ	11	8/26/15	M	65	Roma	Former candidate for mayoral position
HE	BAZ	12	8/26/15	M	45	Roma	Previously employed in workfare program, now without employment
HE	BAZ	13	8/26/16	M	50	Roma	Pressured voter excluded from social assistance benefits
D	Veszprém	1	7/29/15	F	50	Roma	Previous employee of municipality
D	Veszprém	2	7/29/15	M	50	Hungarian	Employee in municipality
D	Veszprém	3	7/29/15	F	50	Roma	Employee in public works program
D	Veszprém	4	8/3/15	M	35	Hungarian	Employee in municipality
D	Veszprém	5	8/3/15	F	60	Hungarian	Employee in municipality

Continued on next page

Table F13 – *Continued from previous page*

Loc.	County	No.	Date	Gender	Age	Ethnicity	Description
D	Veszprém	6	8/4/15	M	60	Hungarian	Held public position in municipality during the previous administration
D	Veszprém	7	8/4/15	M	55	Roma	Employee in municipality
D	Veszprém	8	8/8/16	M	35	Roma	Employee in municipality
D	Veszprém	9	8/19/15	F	35	Hungarian	Employee in municipality
D	Veszprém	10	8/19/15	F	65	Hungarian	Retired
TA	Heves	1	6/30/15	M	50	Hungarian	Leader of local NGO
TA	Heves	2	6/30/15	M	40	Roma	Employee in municipality
DZ	Békés	1	6/25/15	M	50	Roma	Coordinator of public works program in the municipality
DZ	Békés	2	6/25/15	M	60	Roma	Representative of Roma minority in municipality
DZ	Békés	3	6/25/15	M	60	Hungarian	Policeman, Active interest in local affairs of municipality
DZ	Békés	4	6/26/15	M	45	Roma	Principal of local school
DZ	Békés	5	6/26/15	M	50	Roma	Public works employee
DZ	Békés	6	6/27/15	M	40	Roma	Public works employee
DZ	Békés	7	7/8/15	M	60	Hungarian	Former employee in public works program
DZ	Békés	8	7/8/15	M	50	Roma	Roma representative in Roma self-government
DZ	Békés	9	7/8/15	M	45	Hungarian	Employee in municipality
DZ	Békés	10	7/9/15	F	30	Hungarian	Former representative in municipality, also important employer
ND	BAZ	1	9/21/15	M	50	Roma	Employee in municipality
ND	BAZ	2	9/21/15	M	60	Roma	Retired
ND	BAZ	3	9/22/15	M	45	Hungarian	Employee in municipality
ND	BAZ	4	9/22/15	F	65	Hungarian	Employee in municipality
ND	BAZ	5	9/23/15	M	60	Hungarian	Competed as mayoral candidate; holds public position in municipality
ND	BAZ	6	9/23/15	F	45	Hungarian	Director of local organization

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Table F13 – *Continued from previous page*

Loc.	County	No.	Date	Gender	Age	Ethnicity	Description
ND	BAZ	7	9/24/15	M	40	Roma	Employee in municipality
F	BAZ	1	10/23/15	M	50	Roma	Employee in municipality
F	BAZ	2	10/23/15	F	45	Roma	Public works employee
F	BAZ	3	10/24/15	M	60	Hungarian	Former candidate for mayoral position
F	BAZ	4	10/24/15	F	50	Roma	Public works employee
F	BAZ	5	10/24/15	M	60	Hungarian	Farmer

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